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NEW YORK AND LONDON 
I am far from the first to suggest that moral actions are prudent. 
As we have seen, this idea spans human history, from the teach-
ings of major world religions, to ancient Western and non-Western 
philosophy, to common tropes in fiction, to how we typically raise 
our children and treat morality in our adult lives, and so on. How-
ever, Chapter 2’s theory of prudence is novel. We saw that prudent 
individuals typically appear to internalize a specific form of ‘moral 
risk-aversion’: negative attitudes that treat immoral actions as risks 
categorically not worth taking due to the potential for severe re-
gret, along with positive attitudes that treat moral actions as always 
having greater expected aggregate lifetime personal utility than 
immoral behavior. Chapter 2 theorized that prudent people tend 
to internalize these two sets of attitudes as standing constraints 
on first-order decision-making, thereby adopting a ‘morally con-
strained utility-maximization’ strategy in their everyday life deci-
sions (see Figure 2.4).
This chapter argues that Chapter 2’s theory of prudence entails 
a novel normative and descriptive theory of morality: a revised 
version of the theory I defended in Rightness as Fairness: A Moral 
and Political Theory. Section 3.1 provides an overview of Right-
ness as Fairness, along with a number of clarifying revisions. Sec-
tion 3.2 then uses Chapter 2’s theory of prudence to provide a new 
defense of Rightness as Fairness, showing how this book’s the-
ory of prudence can be used to defend the theory from a variety 
of criticisms. Finally, Section 3.3 shows how, when Chapter  2’s 
theory of prudence is combined with this chapter’s derivation of 
Rightness as Fairness, the result is a unified normative and de-
scriptive neurofunctional theory of prudence, morality, and po-
litical morality.
3 Derivation of Morality 
from Prudence
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1 Rightness as Fairness: An Overview
In Rightness as Fairness, I defended a broader psychological claim 
than I have here: namely, that virtually all of us (at least sometimes) 
want to know our future interests and weigh them against our in-
terests in the present, so that we can be sure to act in ways we will 
not regret later.1 Although I briefly drew connections between this 
claim and prudence,2 I did not provide a detailed theory of pru-
dence. Instead, I used a number of moral and non-moral cases to 
illustrate how we often appear to have these motives. Specifically, 
I argued that when the stakes of a decision seem high—such as 
when we are tempted to violate moral norms or are faced with a 
big life-decision (such as buying a home or getting married)—we 
sometimes want to know before making the decision whether we 
will regret it afterward.3 I thought readers would find these cases 
persuasive. After all, people often talk about agonizing choices that 
‘keep us up at night’, saying things such as, ‘I wish I knew whether 
buying this home is the right choice’, or ‘I wish I knew whether I 
will regret lying to my boss’. Finally, I briefly suggested that these 
attitudes are prudent, as they keep us from making rash decisions 
such as buying a home on a whim or lying on impulse. The basic 
idea was that prudent people approach decisions with large stakes 
carefully, and with great forethought, in order to avoid decisions 
they might regret.4
I then argued that this kind of desire to know one’s future inter-
ests generates a problem of diachronic instrumental rationality: the 
‘problem of possible future selves’—the problem of how an agent 
can possibly satisfy their desire to know their future interests be-
fore the future occurs.5 I recognized that this problem is probably 
irresolvable in part, as the future can lead us to have involuntary 
and semi-voluntary interests (such as unexpected emotional reac-
tions) that we cannot fully anticipate or control.6 However, I then 
argued in Chapter 3 of Rightness as Fairness that it is possible for 
one’s present and future selves to cooperate across time to partially 
resolve the problem, solving it as far as it can be. First, I argued that 
although one’s present and future selves can both realize that one’s 
present self cannot know which future will occur, both sets of selves 
can also realize that they each appear to have voluntary control 
over at least some of their interests: interests that they can choose.7 
Second, I argued that because both sets of selves can recognize 
that they can voluntarily choose at least some of their interests, it is 
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possible and rational for one’s present and future selves to forge and 
uphold a diachronic contract (across time) on voluntary interests 
to share with each other, given one’s ignorance of the future in the 
present. Finally, I argued that the only contract that can achieve 
this is an agreement to act on voluntary interests that one’s present 
and every possible future self can agree to share, regardless of how 
the future might turn out. This enables one’s present self to act in 
ways they know will satisfy their voluntary future interests no mat-
ter how the future turns out, provided they choose in the future to 
uphold the contract. The principle representing this contract is as 
follows (clarifying revisions in italics):
The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative: voluntarily aim for its 
own sake, in every relevant action,8 to best satisfy the moti-
vational interests it is instrumentally rational for one’s present 
and every possible future self to universally agree upon given 
their other voluntary, involuntary, and semivoluntary interests 
and co-recognition of the problem of possible future selves, 
where relevant actions are determined recursively as actions it 
is instrumentally rational for one’s present and possible future 
selves to universally agree upon as such when confronted by 
the problem of possible future selves—and then, when the fu-
ture comes, voluntarily choose to uphold your having acted as 
such.9
On its face, this principle might seem implausible. First, it is very 
complex—which has led some to wonder how ordinary laypeople 
might understand or follow it.10 Second, it may appear unclear why 
it is rational for one’s present and future selves to forge and uphold 
such a contract, given how unlikely some of one’s possible future 
selves are.11 Third, it may seem unclear how one’s future and ev-
ery possible future self might arrive at such a universal agreement, 
given just how many possible future selves one has and the diversity 
of their potential interests.12 Finally, several critics of Rightness as 
Fairness doubted the psychological claims the above argument is 
based upon. Why think that all of us sometimes want to know our 
future interests before the future occurs, so that we can avoid all 
possible regret?13
Shortly, I will argue that this book’s theory of prudence helps 
resolve these issues. However, in order to do so, allow me to first 
present the rest of Rightness as Fairness as I previously defended it, 
along with some clarifying revisions.
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1.1 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative: Three 
Formulations
The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative holds that when one en-
counters the problem of possible future selves (viz. wanting to know 
one’s future interests), one ought to act on voluntarily  chosen inter-
ests that one’s present and every possible future self can agree to 
share given their other interests. Let us now think about who one’s 
possible future selves are. As Chapter 2 argued, prudent agents 
should regard their future as profoundly  uncertain—as over the 
course of a complete life, one’s life can turn in all kinds of unex-
pected directions. One related feature of human beings is that our 
involuntary and semi-voluntary inclinations to selfishness, other- 
regardingness, and altruism can change from moment to moment, 
week to week, or year to year. Nobody (besides Christ perhaps) al-
ways wants to behave altruistically.  Sometimes—and science indi-
cates it is more often than we might like to admit14—we are inclined 
to behave selfishly, often because of emotions that involuntarily or 
semi-voluntarily afflict us, such as anger or jealousy.15 Conversely, 
we also sometimes have other- regarding interests, which may be 
rooted in emotions such as sympathy or compassion,16 but also in 
reason.17 Importantly, the extent to which we become more selfish, 
other-regarding, or altruistic may depend on our earlier choices and 
unexpected events. For example, a single choice in one’s past—to 
pursue fame and career success over love—might alter the over-
all path of one’s life to such an extent that, in one possible future, 
one becomes a narcissistic egoist, while in another possible future, 
one might have become more concerned for others.18 Similarly, as 
St. Augustine’s life famously illustrates, it is possible for a person 
to unexpectedly realize the error of their selfish ways, becoming a 
 person committed to helping others.19
Because in different possible futures, one can involuntarily or 
semi-voluntarily end up with different levels of selfishness, other- 
regard, or even pure altruism, the Categorical-Instrumental Imper-
ative requires one to act on voluntary interests that one’s selfish 
and other-regarding possible future selves can voluntarily agree to 
share despite all of these possible differences. Consequently, the 
 Categorical-Instrumental Imperative can be restated as follows 
(clarifying revisions in italics):
The Humanity-and-Sentience Formulation: voluntarily aim for 
its own sake, in every relevant action, to best satisfy the moti-
vational interests it is instrumentally rational for one’s present 
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and every possible future self to universally agree upon given 
co-recognition that one’s voluntary, involuntary, and semivol-
untary interests could be self-interested (viz. egoism) or con-
cerned with the interests of other human or nonhuman sentient 
beings (viz. other-concern and altruism) along a vast continuum, 
where relevant actions are determined recursively as actions it 
is instrumentally rational for one’s present and possible future 
selves to universally agree upon as such in cases where one’s 
present self wants to know and advance their future interests—
and then, when the future comes, voluntarily choose to uphold 
your having acted as such.20
Now consider what such a universal agreement between one’s pres-
ent and every possible future self would involve. First, insofar as 
many of one’s possible future selves care about their past—and 
many of one’s possible past and future selves care in turn about their 
future—a truly universal agreement between one’s present and ev-
ery possible future self must be an agreement between every possi-
ble version of oneself one could possibly care about: past, present, 
and future. Such an agreement would, in other words, be a kind 
of ‘categorical agreement’: an agreement on how to act regardless 
of how the past or future might possibly turn out, and regardless of 
what one’s interests in the past, present, or future could possibly 
be. Second, such an agreement would thus be one that advances 
the interests of one’s egoistic possible selves but also the interests 
of one’s other-regarding possible selves (including, as a limit-case, 
purely altruistic possible selves who care about the interests of 
all other human and nonhuman sentient beings equally).21 Con-
sequently, a truly universal agreement between one’s present and 
every possible future self must strike a fair intrapersonal bargain 
between the interests of one’s egoistic and other-regarding possible 
selves. Finally, to that extent, a universal agreement between all of 
one’s possible selves will also constitute a fair interpersonal bar-
gain between one’s own interests and the interests of other human 
and nonhuman sentient beings one might end up caring about. 
Consequently, I concluded that the Categorical-Instrumental Im-
perative requires acting in ways are fair to oneself (intrapersonally, 
to all of one’s possible selves), where this is in turn identical to act-
ing in ways that are fair to others (interpersonally, to all sentient 
beings). As a result, I concluded that the Categorical-Instrumental 
Imperative can thus be restated in a third way (clarifying revisions 
in italics):
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The Kingdom-of-Human-and-Sentient-Ends Formulation: vol-
untarily aim for its own sake, in every relevant action, to ab-
stract away from the interests (or ends) of particular human 
or nonhuman sentient beings, acting instead on interests (or 
ends) it is instrumentally rational for all human and nonhu-
man sentient beings to universally agree to share given their 
different voluntary, involuntary, and semivoluntary interests—
including any and every possible combination of egoistic and 
other- regarding desires different beings might have—where rel-
evant actions are determined recursively as actions it is instru-
mentally rational for one’s present and possible future selves to 
universally agree upon as such in cases where one’s present self 
wants to know and advance their future interests—and then, 
when the future comes, voluntarily choose to uphold your hav-
ing acted as such.22
1.2 Comparison to Kantian Ethics
Notice how similar the three formulations of this principle are 
to Immanuel Kant’s moral principle, the Categorical Imperative. 
Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative holds that 
morality requires acting on maxims one can will to be universal laws 
of nature.23 The first formulation of my Categorical- Instrumental 
Imperative is similar, entailing that morality requires acting in 
ways that all of one’s own possible selves (and by extension, every 
other being they could care about) could universally agree upon. 
Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative holds that 
we are to treat the humanity in ourselves and others as an end-in-
itself.24 Although the meaning of this formula remains debated,25 
my second formulation of the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative 
is similar but more inclusive. It requires one to act in ways that 
respect and advance the interests of oneself and every sentient be-
ing one could possibly care about, given their possible interests.26 
Finally, my third formulation of the Categorical-Instrumental Im-
perative, which requires seeking a consensus agreement between 
one’s own interests and the interests of all possible sentient beings 
one could care about, is similar to but more inclusive than Kant’s 
Kingdom of Ends formula, which holds only that morality is a mat-
ter of acting on principles that bring the ends of all rational beings 
into unity.27
My Categorical-Instrumental Imperative thus bears many simi-
larities to Kantian ethics. However, there are a number of critical 
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differences. First, my principle and its defense do not involve ap-
peal to any special kind of imperative: namely, genuine categorical 
imperatives, or ‘ought’-statements that are true without any condi-
tion.28 Genuine categorical imperatives remain controversial.29 My 
account does not deny that genuine categorical imperatives might 
be true. On the contrary, I argue elsewhere that if they are, they con-
verge with the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative and Rightness 
as Fairness.30 My account in Rightness as Fairness (and in the present 
book) merely holds that we can derive a robust form of ‘categorical 
moral justification’ from purely instrumental normative foundations.
This is important for a number of reasons. First, I contend it is 
an epistemically more certain foundation for moral philosophy. 
Whereas categorical normativity is controversial, virtually every-
one (including children, criminals, and psychopaths) appears to 
recognize instrumental normativity.31 Second, Rightness as Fair-
ness appears more likely to motivate moral behavior than Kan-
tianism, as my theory roots moral concern in mental time-travel, 
risk-aversion, and other-perspective-taking—all of which have all 
been consistently linked to moral cognition and moral motivation 
(see Chapter 1). Conversely, the motivational power of moral prin-
ciples alone (qua Kantianism) has been empirically challenged.32 
Third, although some argue that Kantian ethics can include animals 
(through arguments similar to those in Rightness as Fairness33), my 
account includes animals more naturally, as my account roots mo-
rality itself in terms of what our possible future selves might end 
up caring about (including other creatures). Fourth, my account 
holds promise to unify a variety of competing moral frameworks—
deontology, utilitarianism, contractualism, and virtue ethics—in 
a manner that Kantianism does not. As I will argue shortly, once 
we see that the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative is (typically) 
prudent for individuals, we can see that it also plausibly maximizes 
long-term expected social utility (viz. utilitarianism)—as it requires 
us to advance our own ends and the ends of others in a ‘positive 
sum’ manner via universal agreement (viz. contractualism). Fur-
ther, as we will also see, the principles of fairness that I derive from 
the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative place constraints on how 
we can treat others (viz. deontology), while also requiring the devel-
opment of standing dispositions of character to act on these prin-
ciples (viz. virtue ethics). Consequently, this book’s theory not only 
holds promise to unify prudence and morality but also the insights 
of four major moral frameworks.34
Derivation of Morality from Prudence 67
Finally, whereas Kant’s formulas are thought to entail several 
different (and potentially divergent) moral tests,35 my formulations 
of Categorical-Instrumental Imperative jointly entail a single moral 
test: a Moral Original Position. To see how, consider what it would 
be to act in ways that one’s self and all possible human and nonhu-
man sentient beings could agree upon together, abstracting away 
from their differences (viz. my Kingdom-of-Human-and- Sentient-
Ends Formula). John Rawls famously asks us to imagine all indi-
viduals in a given domestic society as represented behind a veil of 
ignorance,36 a hypothetical device that precludes anyone from arbi-
trarily privileging themselves or their interests over  others—which 
he then later extends to an international community of peoples.37 
Importantly, Rawls imposes a variety of stipulations on the original 
position, including that it only includes human beings38 (in the first 
instance, representatives of citizens within a single domestic society 
assuming a closed society39), along with assumptions of reasonably 
favorable conditions,40 strict-compliance with whichever principles 
are selected,41 and a focus on major governmental institutions (viz. 
the ‘basic structure’ of society).42 Many of these assumptions have 
been contested, with critics objecting to Rawls’s strict-compliance 
assumption,43 his anthropocentric focus on human beings,44 his 
abstracting away from justice in families,45 and focus on a closed 
society instead of a cosmopolitan concern for all human beings 
globally.46
My Categorical-Instrumental Imperative does not justify any of 
Rawls’s controversial assumptions. The Categorical- Instrumental 
requires us to act in ways that all of our possible selves can agree 
upon simpliciter, irrespective of the conditions that they could 
possibly find themselves in, and irrespective of what they might 
possibly care about. Bearing this in mind, consider a Moral 
Original Position: a hypothetical situation where one deliberates 
from behind a veil of ignorance, but without any of Rawls’s other 
controversial assumptions about justice.47 In the Moral Origi-
nal Position, we simply imagine a prudent agent behind a veil of 
ignorance whose task is to seek to advance their own interests, 
and the interests of every possible being they might end up caring 
about, without being able to bet on probabilities. This is what the 
 Categorical-Instrumental Imperatives holds: that one should act 
on principles that all of their possible selves could accept as a con-
sensus agreement, given all of the possible beings whose interests 
they might care about.
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Although some critics have worried there is ‘nothing moral’ 
about the Moral Original Position, suggesting it is purely pruden-
tial and does not provide epistemic reasons to conform to which-
ever principles are rational from its standpoint,48 we are now in a 
better position to understand precisely how the Moral Original Po-
sition is an epistemically justified moral model. First, we are epis-
temically justified in adopting the Moral Original Position—and in 
acting upon whichever principles are instrumentally rational from 
behind its veil of ignorance—to the extent that we have epistemic 
justification for believing that prudence normatively requires act-
ing on the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative. I will provide this 
derivation shortly using Chapter 2’s theory of prudence. Second, 
the Moral Original Position is a moral model insofar as it requires 
us to deliberate fairly about our own interests in relation to the 
interests of others. Its veil of ignorance not only requires us to care 
about the interests of all human and nonhuman sentient beings 
impartially, which is widely thought to be a defining feature of 
morality.49 It also approximates Kant’s influential notions of mo-
rality as universalizability50 and of realizing a ‘kingdom of ends’, 
a harmony of ends arrived at via abstracting away from particu-
lar ends.51 Although some readers may worry my account is still 
merely one of prudence (viz. instrumental rationality) rather than 
morality (viz. ‘categorical imperatives’), Chapters 4 and 5 argue 
that principles of theory selection support reconceptualizing mo-
rality in these terms.
1.3 Four Principles of Fairness
Allow me to now summarize the Four Principles of Fairness that I 
derived from the Moral Original Position. In Rightness as Fairness, 
I argued that in the Moral Original Position, all one knows are gen-
eral facts about sentience, interests, and agency.52 First, one knows 
behind its veil of ignorance that all human and nonhuman sentient 
beings experience the world, having interests of their own. Second, 
one can recognize behind the veil that every being has higher-order 
interests: an interest in not having their first-order goals thwarted 
(viz. coercion), and an interest in receiving assistance when they 
cannot achieve their goals on their own and desire assistance (viz. 
mutual assistance). Because all human and nonhuman sentient be-
ings have these two higher-order interests, I argued that it is ratio-
nal to agree to at least two principles of fairness53 from behind the 
Moral Original Position’s veil of ignorance:
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The Principle of Negative Fairness: all of our morally relevant 
 actions should have as a guiding ideal, setting all costs aside, 
avoiding and minimizing coercion in all its forms (coercion result-
ing from intentional acts, natural forces, false beliefs, and so on), 
for all human and nonhuman sentient beings, for its own sake.
The Principle of Positive Fairness: all of our morally relevant 
actions should have as a guiding ideal, setting all costs aside, 
assisting all human and nonhuman sentient beings in achieving 
interests they cannot best achieve on their own and want assis-
tance in achieving, for its own sake.54
I then argued, however, that these principles pose problems of 
costs and conflicts. First, the Principle of Negative Fairness 
can generate internal ‘coercion conflicts’. In order to minimize 
 coercion in the world, including what I have called natural coer-
cion,55 we sometimes need to coerce, as some degree of coercion 
(viz. police or military force) may be necessary to prevent greater 
amounts of coercion (viz. crimes or military invasion). Second, 
the Principles of Negative and Positive Fairness can conflict with 
each other. Sometimes the best means to help some is to coerce 
others (via taxation, etc.). Indeed, this is what libertarians and 
liberal-egalitarians disagree over in political philosophy: liber-
tarians argue that it is wrong to coerce people to help others, 
whereas liberal-egalitarians think this is what justice requires.56 
Finally, the principles of Negative and Positive Fairness run up 
against issues of personal costs. Recall that although some of 
one’s possible future selves may be altruistic—seeking to avoid 
coercing others and to help others selflessly—many of one’s pos-
sible future selves are more self-interested, not wanting to bear 
particular costs for others’ sake. This is often salient in discus-
sions of applied ethics. For example, some theorists (such as Peter 
Singer) argue that people should be willing to endure great per-
sonal costs to help others in great need.57 However, others argue 
such costs may require too much sacrifice for the sake of others.58 
The parties to the Moral Original Position should recognize these 
issues behind the veil. Specifically, although they possess all-
things-equal grounds to avoid and minimize coercion (viz. Nega-
tive Fairness) and help others (viz. Positive Fairness), the various 
possible selves they might be also possess diverging interests in 
how to settle costs and conflicts generated by the Principles of 
Negative and Positive Fairness.
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Consequently, I argued the parties to the Moral Original 
Position have rational grounds behind the veil to agree upon a 
third principle: a Principle of Fair Negotiation for reconciling 
conflicts within and between the Principles of Negative and Pos-
itive Fairness, and between the application of those principles 
and personal costs. The basic idea here is that negotiating a con-
sensus compromise with others on how to apply the Principles 
of Negative and Positive Fairness is something that would ad-
vance one’s own possible egoistic interests and the interests of 
any other human or nonhuman beings one could end up caring 
about.  Although Rightness as Fairness could have been clearer 
about this, agents in the Moral Original Position should want 
fair negotiation to have a particular end: a consensus agreement 
between all those whom one’s actions might affect (as again, the 
Categorical- Instrumental Imperative requires seeking universal 
agreement). Rightness as Fairness also could have been clearer 
about the nature of fair bargaining. Because the parties to the 
Moral Original Position are behind a veil ignorance—a situation 
in which they cannot arbitrarily favor any of their possible selves 
over others—they should want negotiated agreements not to ar-
bitrarily favor anyone they might care about more above others. 
I will argue below that these clarifications have new and unex-
pected implications for Rightness as Fairness. For now, let us 
simply assume that it is rational for the parties to the Moral Orig-
inal Position to agree upon the following principle for the above 
reasons (clarifying revisions in italics):
The Principle of Fair Negotiation: whether an action is mor-
ally relevant, and how the Principles of Negative and Positive 
Fairness and Virtues of Fairness (see below) should be applied 
factoring in costs, should be settled by a fairly negotiated agree-
ment: either an actual agreement predicated upon all human 
and nonhuman sentient beings potentially affected by the ac-
tion being motivated by the above principles but lacking any ar-
bitrary bargaining advantages or disadvantages, or to the extent 
that such an actual agreement is infeasible (including because 
nonhuman beings affected may not be able to negotiate given their 
capacities), through a hypothetical process approximating the 
same, for its own sake.59
Notice that this principle does not preclude negotiating agents 
from taking into account real-world probabilities. The Categorical- 
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Instrumental Imperative holds that morality is a matter of acting 
on principles that all of one’s possible future selves can agree upon 
without betting on probabilities. The Moral Original Position then 
represents this rational requirement through its veil of ignorance, 
which prevents the agent from favoring any of their possible future 
selves over any others on the basis of probabilities. The Principle 
of Fair Negotiation, on the other hand, is an outcome of a rational 
agent’s deliberations from behind the veil—and my contention here 
is that one’s present and all of one’s possible future selves can agree 
to this principle letting real-world agents negotiate on the basis of 
probabilities. In brief, all of one’s selves can recognize that real-world 
choosers must take into probabilities when weighing the Principles of 
 Negative and Positive Fairness against costs, since all of one’s possi-
ble selves live in an uncertain world where choosing on the basis of 
probabilities cannot be ultimately avoided. This is important because 
the Principle of Fair Negotiation thus permits fair (moral) negotia-
tion to incorporate our preferences for ‘special relationships’—for 
the people (friends, family-members, fellow citizens, and so on) we 
ordinarily take ourselves to be more likely to care about (and care 
about more), compared to complete strangers. All the Principle of 
Fair Negotiation requires is that one does not act in ways that un-
fairly neglect anyone in negotiation, including complete strangers—
as the  Categorical-Instrumental Imperative requires us to recognize 
that it is possible for our future selves to unexpectedly care about 
strangers.60 This account, I believe, is highly intuitive: morality does 
permit us to negotiate norms that protect and prioritize special rela-
tionships. It simply requires that we do so in ways that are not unfair 
to others and which we might regret later.
Next, I argued that individuals in the Moral Original Position 
have rational grounds to agree upon a fourth principle: a principle 
of virtue that requires developing standing psychological disposi-
tions to act on the other principles just arrived at:
The Principle of Virtues of Fairness: all of our morally relevant 
actions should aim to develop and express stable character 
traits to act in accordance with the first three principles of fair-
ness, for its own sake.61
Further, insofar as things like recognizing and addressing coercion, 
recognizing and helping people and animals in need, and negotiat-
ing fairly with others are all skills, this principle implicitly involves 
cultivating such skills.62
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Finally, I combined these Four Principles of Fairness into a sin-
gle criterion of moral rightness, which I now simplify and revise as 
follows to reflect the clarifying revisions above:
Rightness as Fairness: an action is morally right if and only 
if it is morally relevant and pursues or conforms to a fairly 
 negotiated agreement, where such an agreement is the result of 
all human and nonhuman sentient beings potentially  affected 
by the action either actually negotiating with each other 
in  conformity with the Four Principles of Fairness, or else 
through a hypothetical process approximating the same, for 
its own sake; where, finally, moral relevance is determined re-
cursively by the Four Principles of Fairness (coercion,  mutual 
assistance, fair bargaining, and virtues of fairness demarcat-
ing morally-relevant cases).63
This criterion is admittedly complex—so much so that some read-
ers might wonder whether it can possibly be correct. However, we 
will soon see that its complexities in fact appear to be borne out 
in how ordinary people think about morality, particularly the role 
that negotiation plays in social-political theory and social justice 
activism.
2 Rightness as Fairness: A Revised Defense
Critics of Rightness as Fairness questioned several of the claims sum-
marized above. I will now argue that this book’s theory of prudence 
can be used to defend Rightness as Fairness against these concerns in 
a manner that leads the theory in important new directions.
2.1 A Revised Defense of Rightness as Fairness’s Moral 
Psychology
One common objection to Rightness as Fairness was that it is un-
clear whether all people at least sometimes have the motivations 
that produce the ‘problem of possible future selves’: namely, a desire 
to know one’s own future interests.64 However, Chapter 2 defended 
a much more qualified claim: that prudent people typically want 
to avoid regret in morally salient cases, wanting to make (moral) 
choices they know they will not regret (Figure 2.5).
Several points here are important. First, if my argument in 
Chapter 2 is correct, then critics may have been correct in that not 
Derivation of Morality from Prudence 73
everyone may have the kinds of motivational interests that make 
Rightness as Fairness rational. Indeed, as Chapter 5 examines, 
there may be people who lack these motives. Chapter 2’s point was 
more qualified: namely, that prudent people typically have motives 
that generate the ‘problem of possible future selves’, as well as an 
overall moral-prudential psychology that I argue below can be 
used to provide a newer, better derivation of Rightness as Fairness. 
 Further, although I  argued in Chapter 2 that ‘moral risk-aversion’ 
typically appears to be prudent, given life’s many uncertainties and 
particular empirical regularities, Chapter 5 will discuss the possi-
bility of (hopefully rare) counterexamples: individuals who can act 
prudently without moral risk-aversion, and for whom Rightness as 
Fairness may thus be irrational.
To some readers, it might seem unacceptable for a theory to 
contend that morality may not always be rational. However, two 
central points of this book (to be defended in Chapters 4 and 5) 
are that (1) we should select theories on the basis of rigorous prin-
ciples of theory selection, and (2) this book’s theory satisfies such 
principles across a wide variety of normative and descriptive phe-
nomena better than alternative theories of morality and moral 
psychology. Consequently, my response to Rightness as Fairness’s 
prior critics is twofold. First, this book provides better norma-
tive foundations for the theory. Whereas Rightness as Fairness 
defended the overly-ambitious claim that virtually everyone has 
motivations that make its principles rational, Chapter 2 argued 
merely that prudence typically requires these attitudes—an argu-
ment further supported below in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Second, 
I think we should take seriously the (admittedly disturbing) pos-
sibility that morality may not always be normatively binding, for 
precisely the reasons this book’s theory identifies. For as  Chapter 
5 argues, some normative philosophical thought-experiments 
and empirical research both suggest that morality may not al-
ways be normatively binding—though I leave these matters for 
further inquiry.
2.2 A Revised Derivation of the Categorical-Instrumental 
Imperative
In Rightness as Fairness, I provided two derivations of the 
 Categorical-Instrumental Imperative. The first derivation was di-
rect. In cases where one’s dominant motive is to know one’s future 
interests, I argued there is only one way to satisfy this interest: one’s 
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present and possible future selves must agree with one another on 
voluntary interests to share across time given the inability of one’s 
present self to know which future self one will be.65 I also provided 
a second derivation using decision-theory and the mathematics of 
infinity, as I argued we have an infinite variety of possible future 
selves.66 Richard Dees argued that both derivations are unsuccess-
ful, contending that I must show that the expected long-term value 
of moral action is greater than immoral action.67 I will now ad-
dress this concern.
To see how this book’s theory of prudence can be used to 
show that the expected value of conforming to the Categorical- 
Instrumental Imperative is at least typically greater than alterna-
tives, consider again the two moral-prudential lessons examined 
in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 argued that prudent individuals typically 
internalize ‘morally risk-averse’ attitudes: beliefs and desires that 
(1) immorality is not worth the risk of immense regret, and (2) mo-
rality has greater-expected personal outcomes in the long-term, 
at least if you are patient. As we have seen in this chapter, the 
first of these attitudes gives rise to the problem of possible future 
selves. In morally salient cases, the prudent agent does not want 
to risk outcomes their future selves might profoundly regret. In-
stead, they want to make a choice they know they will not regret. 
The direct derivation of the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative 
in Rightness as Fairness (the derivation not involving infinite ex-
pected utilities) showed that the only way to satisfy this negative 
motive is for one’s present and possible future selves to universally 
agree on voluntary interests to share for their own sake, irrespec-
tive of what the future holds. The rest of Rightness Fairness—the 
derivation of the three formulations of the Categorical Instrumen-
tal Imperative, the derivation of the Moral Original Position as a 
moral test, and the Four Principles of Fairness—were then shown 
to be the only principles that achieve that kind of agreement. Con-
sequently, the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative and moral 
content of Rightness as Fairness can be derived from this book’s 
account of prudent individuals’ internalized categorical negative 
attitudes that violating moral norms is never worth the risk of im-
mense regret.
However, this is only half of the story we can now tell. The 
next question then becomes why satisfying this negative motive 
(viz. conformity to Categorical-Instrumental Imperative) is in-
strumentally rational. Rightness as Fairness argued that this can 
be established through the mathematics of infinity. However, we 
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can now see that the answer is more straightforward. Chapter 2 
argued that prudent agents also typically internalize a positive 
set of categorical attitudes—attitudes that morality always has 
better likely personal outcomes than immorality in the long-term, 
at least if you are patient. Dees’s challenge was that my instru-
mental derivation of the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative 
succeeds if and only if the expected value of acting according to 
it is higher than other alternatives. This book has not provided 
a proof of this. Instead, it has defended a narrower thesis: that 
in real life, given various empirical regularities, prudent people 
typically internalize attitudes which entail—for them, given their 
morally risk-averse attitudes—that adherence to the Categorical- 
Instrumental Imperative maximizes expected aggregate lifetime 
personal utility. If this is correct, then it is typically prudent to 
be the kind of person whose attitudes make it rational to obey 
the Categorical- Instrumental Imperative and the moral theory 
(Rightness as Fairness) that principle entails.
Some readers may consider this a serious capitulation, as it 
amounts to recognizing that the Categorical-Instrumental Im-
perative (and Rightness as Fairness) may not always be rational. 
However, my response to this concern is four-fold. First, proof that 
morality is always rational is a bar that no moral theory has ever 
clearly met (which is why there is still so much controversy over 
these issues68). Second, this book’s theory of prudence identifies 
the rationality of morality as an empirical issue: namely, whether, 
and to what extent, moral risk-aversion (as I defended it) is ratio-
nal for different individuals in different contexts. As we will see 
in Chapter 5, I believe this is a very important question for future 
research to pursue. Third, there are further reasons for optimism 
about morality’s rationality, as recent empirical work suggests 
that moral behavior is beneficial for individuals’ physical and 
psychological well-being across the human life span, from child-
hood through later life.69 Finally, this book’s theory of prudence 
 provides an intuitive model of how moral behavior is typically a 
prudent long-term strategy.
We can see how plausible its account is by considering real-life 
cases. Consider wanton ‘immoralists’: the common criminal, 
hitman, mob boss, political dictator, and so on. Although indi-
viduals like these can get away with and benefit from immoral 
behavior, there are grounds for thinking that their willing to risk 
immoral behavior tends to be an imprudent life-strategy, at least 
in the long-run. Criminals tend to end up in trouble with the law, 
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often ending up in prison. Similarly, many political dictators 
throughout history (ranging from Adolf Hitler to Saddam Hus-
sein, Muammar al-Gaddafi, and so on) have ended up deposed 
or killed. Finally, in the course of everyday life, although people 
sometimes seemingly get away with immoral behavior ‘scot-free’, 
we have repeatedly seen ourselves or others face severe social 
sanctions for immoral behavior, such as divorces for infidelity to 
loss of jobs for deception, and so on. Sometimes, as in the case 
of the #MeToo movement’s allegations of sexual misconduct, we 
see people suffer profoundly negative consequences for immoral 
behavior committed many years earlier. For all of these reasons, 
prudent individuals typically learn to not be these kinds of indi-
viduals: to not be individuals willing to risk immoral behavior for 
personal gain. Prudent people like you and I have seen the regrets 
immoral behavior tends to give rise to—so we internalize dispo-
sitions to not risk such immense regrets, instead aiming to behave 
morally ‘for its own sake’. We come to believe that morality is a 
better life-policy than immorality and want to behave morally 
rather than immorally.
Are there potential counterexamples—individuals for whom 
moral risk-aversion is not required by prudence? Perhaps. First, 
there may be ‘high-stakes’ counterexamples: cases of political 
dictators or business leaders who never suffer for their moral 
crimes. Second, there may be ‘low-stakes’ counterexamples: 
cases where people routinely get away with more minor moral in-
fractions, such never returning favors, cutting in line, and so on. 
This book cannot refute all of these potential counterexamples, 
nor do I think it should. Although proof that morality is always 
rational is arguably the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy, no such 
proof is widely accepted. I now believe this is for good reason. 
For as Chapter 5 discusses, I believe the rationality of morality 
is an empirical issue. Chapter 2 merely suggested that you, I, and 
most other everyday prudent people tend to learn over time to 
treat immoral actions as not worth the risk, and to internalize 
attitudes that morality has greater long-term expected benefit. 
I believe Chapter 2 made a compelling case for this, and Chap-
ter 4 will argue that this book’s overall theory coheres well with 
behavioral neuroscience. At the same time, I will recognize in 
Chapter 5 that it is an empirical question how far my account of 
prudence generalizes, and hence, whether morality (qua Right-
ness as Fairness) always is rational. I will now move on to Dees’s 
next objection.
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2.3 Defending Rightness as Fairness’s (Revised) Principles 
of Fairness
Dees also called into question Rightness as Fairness’s account of 
fair negotiation, its Four Principles of Fairness, and standard of 
moral rightness. Here again, I think there is much to learn.
2.3.1 Clarifying the Instrumental Value of Fair Negotiation
Dees’s first concern about the content of Rightness as Fairness is 
that it is unclear what instrumental value negotiating with other 
people has (viz. the Principle of Fair Negotiation), and how negoti-
ating with other people amounts to negotiating agreements between 
our own possible future selves.70 We can now see how this book’s ac-
count of prudence can help us understand the instrumental value of 
negotiating agreements fairly (viz. ideals of coercion- minimization, 
mutual assistance, and fair bargaining), as well as how negotiating 
agreements with others is akin to negotiating agreements between 
our own future selves.
As Chapter 2 argued, prudent individuals typically internalize 
the desire to avoid outcomes they might profoundly regret. This 
means that they want to act in ways that make as many of their 
possible future selves happy with their decisions as possible—in the 
limit, all of them. Now consider the possible future selves one has. 
Some of one’s possible future selves may be relatively selfish, caring 
about their own interests to the exclusion of others’ interests. How-
ever, other possible future selves are more strongly altruistic, caring 
about other people’s (and other creatures’) interests over their own. 
Betting on any of these selves is an inherently risky endeavor. We 
see this in the case of criminals, and most powerfully in morally 
and prudentially tragic cases such as Hitler, Nazism, the  Holocaust, 
and World War II. Criminals bet on their selfish future selves, not 
caring about how they harm others. The problem for criminals, 
however, is that other people do not typically enjoy being treated 
unfairly. For notice again what tends to happen, at least as a broad 
empirical regularity, to immoralists including everyday criminals, 
spouses guilty of infidelity, people who cheat on exams, slavehold-
ers, and dictators such as Hitler. They are typically (though again, 
not always) punished for their unfair behavior, at least in the longer 
run: criminals tend to end up in jail, cheating spouses are often 
found out and divorced, exam-cheaters often receive failing grades 
and academic suspensions, political dictators often end up dead or 
imprisoned, and so on.
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Is it possible to commit immoral acts and never suffer severe 
consequences? Perhaps. Again, some people may indeed get away 
with immoral behavior in perpetuity. However, these individu-
als appear to be outliers. The vast majority of us typically learn 
across childhood, adolescence, and adulthood that immorality is 
a bad bet in an uncertain world. Conversely, why should we think 
that negotiating fair compromises with others is (instrumentally) 
a good bet? The answer again has to do with one’s possible future 
selves. As Chapter 2 argued, prudent individuals have internalized 
attitudes that make them want to act, in morally salient cases, in 
ways they will not regret (Figure 2.5). On my account, it is this 
motive that generates the ‘problem of possible future selves’: the 
problem of how to know one’s future interests before the future 
occurs. I argue only the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative re-
solves this problem.
Bearing this in mind, consider the ways one’s future selves can 
end up regretting one’s actions in the present. One way one can end 
up regretting one’s actions is by behaving immorally, as this can 
result in social punishment or guilt. However, another way one can 
end up regretting one’s actions is by sacrificing an unfair amount for 
others. Sometimes, when we give others more than is fair, we invol-
untarily or semivoluntarily end up feeling resentful, such as when 
we help friends who never help in return, or try to do nice things for 
others only to have them treat us ‘like a doormat’. Because some of 
one’s possible future selves are more selfish and others more altru-
istic, betting firmly on one set of selves over the others is a serious 
risk. The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative holds that the only 
instrumentally rational response to these possibilities is to act in 
ways that one’s selfish and altruistic future selves can agree upon 
despite their differences—so that one’s future selves will not regret 
one’s actions in the present no matter how the future goes. Fur-
thermore, I argue that this is precisely what fairly negotiated agree-
ments accomplish. When you and I negotiate a fair agreement, we 
act in ways that advance our own egoistic interests while also ad-
vancing the interests of the other person—a person who our future 
selves might end up caring about, either for self-interested reasons 
(if you object to how I treated you and retaliate) or due to empathy. 
Conversely, when we fail to negotiate fair agreements with others, 
we run serious risks: risks of treating others in ways that they object 
to and punish us for, or ways that involve us sacrificing so much 
that we regret it because our future selves judge we sacrificed ‘too 
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much’. Negotiated agreements enable one to act in ways such that 
one’s future self can advance their interests without feeling like they 
sacrificed excessively.
I believe this is an intuitive idea. If I fail to negotiate fairly with 
you, treating you the way I (unilaterally) think is best, then you 
may object and seek to punish me for failing to care sufficiently for 
your interests as you understand them. Conversely, if you fail to 
negotiate fairly with me, then you may treat me in ways I think are 
unfair or expect too much. It is only by arriving at and upholding 
a fair agreement that we can both be sure to advance our inter-
ests, whether they are more self-concerned (viz. egoism) or other- 
concerned (viz. altruism).
Finally, we can see the disvalue of failure to negotiate fairly by 
considering cases involving individuals or groups. Consider two 
spouses who disagree over how to raise their child. If one spouse 
insists upon their way, coercing the other spouse to go along with 
them, the other spouse may become resentful, blaming them for 
every bad decision the child makes and sparking constant argu-
ments. And indeed, fairness violations generally appear to stim-
ulate retribution.71 Conversely, if the two spouses fairly negotiate 
an agreement, then they can raise the child in harmony, accord-
ing to an agreement that both sides perceive as fair. Further, if 
the child-rearing strategy they agree upon appears to fall short of 
their mutual satisfaction, they can fairly renegotiate a new strat-
egy. Similar considerations plausibly apply to groups, including 
nations. When one group treats another unfairly, abusing bargain-
ing advantages to coerce the other group—as in slavery, racism, 
sexism, and so on—the dominated group may be (rightly) inclined 
to seek retribution. Further, although retribution may be impossi-
ble or ineffective in the short-term, it can become effective as time 
goes on—as illustrated by many social conflicts, ranging from the 
US Civil War to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and so on. Yet 
retribution and counter-retribution are plausibly in no one’s inter-
est. As historian and onetime US Diplomat to Germany William 
Dodd once said, ‘It would be no sin if statesmen learned enough 
of history to realize that no system that implies control of society 
by privilege seekers has ended in any other way than collapse’.72 
It is only by fairly negotiating agreements with others, both indi-
vidually and collectively, that we are able to realize a future that 
advances our own interests and the interests of others we might end 
up caring about.
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As such, I believe Dees’s concerns about the instrumental ra-
tionality of fair negotiation can be provisionally met. First, fairly 
negotiating with others appears to typically be instrumentally op-
timal given uncertainty about the future. Second, negotiating fairly 
with others is ‘negotiating with one’s future selves’ in the sense that 
fairly negotiated agreements with other individuals and groups pre-
serve the ability of one’s own future selves to pursue their own goals 
and the goals of others they might end up caring about. However, 
Chapter 5 will explore the possibility that Rightness as Fairness 
(and hence, fair negotiation) is not always rational, ultimately leav-
ing these as important empirical questions to be answered by future 
research.
2.3.2 Clarifying Coercion-Minimization, Mutual 
Assistance, and Fair Bargaining
Dees’s second concern about the content of Rightness as Fairness 
concerns the nature of fair negotiation. First, Dees writes:
[E]ven if we accept that the principle requires actual negotia-
tions between separate people, approximating equal bargain-
ing power only makes sense if we already know what counts 
as the requisite form of equality. But equality is a morally 
loaded notion, which is supposed to be the product of the 
negotiations.73
Second, Dees writes:
…Arvan takes the actual negotiation clause very seriously, 
citing it as one of the great advantages of his view…. But to 
avoid the obvious problems with forcing people to negotiate 
for basic rights, he concedes that we do not need to negotiate 
with people who do not share a commitment to basic equality 
and to his principles of non-coercion and assistance to others 
(182–84). He somehow misses the fact that the most conten-
tious debates—those about abortion, women’s rights, LGBTQI 
rights, and even about welfare rights—are mostly about what is 
required to treat people equally and without coercion. On his 
grounds, then, these debates are not ones open to negotiations, 
but he thereby undermines the centrality of actual negotiations 
that are the hallmark of his theory.74
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I argue that Chapter 2’s account of prudence, and the revisions 
made to Rightness as Fairness in this chapter, resolve these prob-
lems in ways that lead the theory in important new directions.
I believe Dees is right: coercion-minimization, mutual assis-
tance, and equal bargaining are all moralized notions.  Abortion- 
opponents think abortion restrictions minimize coercion by pro-
tecting fetuses from death. Defenders of abortion rights, how-
ever, think abortion restrictions unfairly coerce women. And so 
on (for LGBTQIA+ rights, etc.). Let us think, then, about how a 
prudent individual—one who faces the problem of possible fu-
ture selves—should consider this problem. Here the very same 
problem of uncertainty underlying Chapter 2’s account of pru-
dence recurs. Consider an anti-abortion activist or politician who 
opposes LGBTQIA+ rights. It may seem like a ‘good bet’ for this 
person (for  instance, based on their personal religious convic-
tions) to seek to impose their moral views on others—passing laws 
against abortion or LGBTQIA+ rights. However, what if—entirely 
 unexpectedly—they come to have a family member who these pol-
icies would negatively impact? For example, what if, after passing 
an  anti-abortion law, a politician has a daughter who loses her life 
seeking an illegal abortion? Or, what if, after passing a law against 
gay marriage, a politician learns their child is gay? In both cases, 
the person’s moral beliefs and preferences may radically change—
and indeed, there are notable cases in which people’s moral views 
and preferences unexpectedly changed for precisely these kinds of 
reasons.75 Do some people stick to their moral beliefs on particular 
issues (e.g. LGBTQIA+ rights) even after having a personal expe-
rience that challenges said belief? Almost certainly. The question, 
though, is whether it is rational to bet that one’s moral beliefs on 
controversial issues will not change in an uncertain world. This is 
less obvious, given that people’s beliefs often do seem to change 
over time and in unexpected ways. For example, cultural attitudes 
toward LGBTQIA+ issues changed quickly and dramatically in 
the US,76 as they have for many other social moral issues, such as 
the morality of marijuana legalization,77 the morality of particular 
wars,78 and abortion.79 If this book is correct, a prudent person 
should thus not assume that their beliefs and preferences on con-
troversial moral issues will remain the same. They should instead 
recognize that life is profoundly uncertain over the long-term, and 
that their moral views on contentious moral issues might change 
over time in unpredictable ways.
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Let us suppose, then, that prudent individuals will agree to 
Rightness as Fairness’s principles (via my previous arguments), 
but also know that their own views and preferences about how to 
interpret and apply these principles might change dramatically 
over time. What should they then do? They should seek a decision- 
procedure that addresses that problem—one settling how people 
who are committed to ideals of coercion-minimization, mutual as-
sistance, and fair (nonarbitrary) bargaining power should respond 
to the fact that their own views might change over time. Is there 
such a model? Indeed, there is: a series of Rawlsian Social-Political 
Original Positions.
To see how, consider the grounds that Rawls gives for the orig-
inal position as a model of justice. Rawls supposes that the model 
represents citizens who (A) are committed to cooperating fairly 
for mutual advantage but (B) disagree over exactly what fairness 
involves, and also (C) recognize that their own views and prefer-
ences might change over time. In such a model, what is it to be 
committed to cooperating fairly for mutual advantage? As Rawls 
himself delineates, every person in the original position wants to 
advance their own preferences: they do not want to be coercively 
prevented from achieving things they want, and they may want to 
be helped by others (i.e. society) in pursuing their goals. The veil of 
ignorance then ensures that no one has arbitrary bargaining power 
over anyone else. Finally, the veil of ignorance requires the parties 
to recognize that their own preferences might change over time. 
Rawls’s original position thus represents all of the preferences and 
uncertainty about the future that instrumentally rational agents 
should arrive at via the Moral Original Position. It models peo-
ple committed to coercion-minimization (Negative Fairness), mu-
tual assistance (Positive Fairness), nonarbitrary bargaining (Fair 
Negotiation), and the development of a standing sense of fairness 
( Virtues as Fairness).
Consequently, Rightness as Fairness should not be seen as entail-
ing that its Four Principles of Fairness directly specify what is right 
or wrong for any situation or issue (e.g. abortion, global poverty). 
Rather, this book’s theory of prudence can be seen as entailing a 
Prudential Original Position for deriving principles of prudence, a 
Moral Original Position for deriving moral principles, and a series 
of Social-Political Original Positions for interpreting and applying 
Rightness as Fairness under different possible social and political 
conditions, as people’s views and preferences emerge or change over 
time. Allow me to explain.
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2.3.3 Revising Rightness as Fairness’s Content as a Moral 
and Political Theory
Dees’s final critique is that I did not adequately circumscribe the 
moral limits of negotiation:
Arvan emphasizes negotiations because he rightly observes 
that most human interactions are negotiated as we go…. But 
in practice the real-life negotiations that he promotes are ei-
ther mere exercises in power or they are bounded by moral 
rules, rules that must be in place before the negotiations 
begin.80
Dees’s concerns here are justified and have led me to see that Right-
ness as Fairness—as I previously developed it—is incomplete.
First, although Dees is correct that people rarely have equal/
nonarbitrary bargaining power in real life, in many cases we do ap-
proximate it. We approximate equal bargaining power, for example, 
in friendships and relationships among equals, such as in marriages 
where neither spouse exploits unfair bargaining power over the 
other (such as financial power). In these cases, I think it is entirely 
intuitive to say that morality is the result of actual negotiation: in 
relationships among equals, the equal parties settle the moral terms 
of their interactions through forging and upholding fair agreements 
with each other.
Second, notice that there is an increasing realization in social 
and political theory that this is what justice requires more gener-
ally: eliminating arbitrary bargaining advantages. For example, 
consider evolving standards of consent in sexual relationships. 
One emerging ideal is that of equal bargaining power, such that 
the requirement not to abuse power is a requirement on consent 
itself. Similarly, consider conversations about white privilege: 
here, too, the idea is that it is wrong and unjust to not help those 
who have been (or are currently) oppressed, given one’s own 
greater bargaining power as a white person. In other words, it is 
increasingly recognized that in order for our individual actions 
to be moral (viz. not wrongly coercing others through unfair 
bargaining power), social and political mechanisms must be in 
place to ensure there are no arbitrary inequalities in bargaining 
power.
Notice what this suggests. Rawls wrote in A Theory of Justice 
that the model of justice as fairness he presents is one that a 
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certain kind of person will find attractive: people who live in 
modern-democratic conditions. Why? I think we see the answer 
in the trends just mentioned. Many (though by no means all) 
people in modern democracies have, to a greater or lesser extent, 
internalized Rightness as Fairness’s norms of fairness: ideals of 
non-coercion (e.g. free speech), mutual assistance (e.g. social se-
curity), and view that arbitrary bargaining advantages are unfair 
(no one should be disadvantaged on the basis of race, gender, 
etc.). More importantly, if this book is correct, there is a deeper 
truth here: namely, that prudent people will have these motives, 
wanting to organize their society on fair grounds—grounds that 
aim to reduce coercion, assist each other, and realize nonarbi-
trary bargaining power over contested issues (viz. Rightness as 
Fairness).
We can now see that Rawls gave us a model of exactly this: a 
model of free and equal individuals seeking to apply Rightness 
as Fairness to social-political conditions. By representing every 
individual in society behind a veil of ignorance, every party to 
the original position is given (A) an equal, nonarbitrary say over 
the extent to which they are (B) free from coercion and (C) able 
to seek and receive assistance by others—which is what Right-
ness as Fairness’s Four Principles of Fairness entitle everyone 
to. Hence, Rawlsian Social-Political Original Positions just are 
models of what Rightness as Fairness requires, viz. prudence and 
morality. But there are further implications. If, as I argued pre-
viously, prudence and morality are a matter of acting in ways 
that treat one’s future self as though their interests could be 
identical to any possible human or nonhuman sentient beings, 
agents motivated by Rightness as Fairness should want to realize 
a fair world: a world that treats every person and nonhuman sen-
tient being they might care about as fairly as possible, including 
future generations. This suggests that prudence—which in the 
broadest sense means realizing a world that is rational for one’s 
future selves, given life’s uncertainty—requires settling how to 
apply Rightness as Fairness through a Cosmopolitan Original 
Position, which is something Rawls’s cosmopolitan critics have 
long maintained.81
If this is correct, then Rightness as Fairness is not the end of 
social-political theory or applied ethics: it is the beginning. Pru-
dence is a matter of acting on principles that are rational from 
a Prudential Original Position, morality is a matter of acting on 
principles (Rightness as Fairness) that are rational from a Moral 
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Original Position, and interpreting and applying Rightness as 
Fairness requires adopting a series of Social-Political Original 
Positions—beginning with a Cosmopolitan Original Position that 
includes all persons and sentient beings as entitled to fairness. Al-
low me to elaborate.
First, there is a question of which principles individuals in a 
Cosmopolitan Original Position would agree to at the level of ideal 
theory, that is, for defining a world in which all persons and sen-
tient beings would be treated fairly. Many have suggested these 
principles are ones that would afford every human being in the 
world equal rights and liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and 
maximize the income and wealth of the world’s global poor82—
and others have argued for including animals in Rawlsian original 
positions.83 However, another possibility is that individuals in a 
Cosmopolitan Original Position would recognize the importance 
of nation-states. In that case, it might be rational for individuals 
in the Cosmopolitan Original Position to agree to adopt an Inter-
national Original Position to model fairness to nation-states of the 
sort Rawls defended in The Law of Peoples.84 Next, individuals in 
a Cosmopolitan Original Position plausibly have grounds to seek 
an agreement on what fairness requires within nation-states—
which would require them to adopt a Domestic Original Position 
of the sort Rawls defended in A Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism.85
Finally, individuals at each level should be concerned not only 
with understanding what Rightness as Fairness requires under 
ideal conditions (viz. assumptions of strict-compliance), but also 
how to interpret and apply Rightness as Fairness’s principles fairly 
in our presently unfair world. In recent work, I have argued that 
this is best understood in terms of another type of iteration of the 
original position: a Nonideal Original Position that can be adapted 
to different kinds of unfair conditions (global unfairness, unfair-
ness in modern-democracies, etc.) to specify what is fair in a given 
social-political domain given unfairness.86 Although this work is 
still in its early stages, I have suggested that the Nonideal Original 
Position results in a variety of plausible principles for redressing 
injustice and unequal bargaining power.
The result we have ended up at is this. Some philosophers 
have criticized Rawls’s outsized influence on modern political 
philosophy—arguing that Rawls’s overall approach to theoriz-
ing about justice is misguided.87 Our conclusions here, how-
ever, suggest otherwise. If this book’s theory of prudence and 
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morality is indeed the best explanation for a wide variety of 
relevant phenomena—as Chapter 4 will argue—then the impor-
tance of Rawls’s original position has been underestimated: a 
variety of iterations of the original position are necessary for 
understanding the normative nature of prudence, morality, and 
justice  (Figure 3.1).
3 A Unified Descriptive Theory of Prudential, Moral, 
and Social-Political Psychology
Finally, my account entails the following unified descriptive theory 
of prudential, moral, and social-political psychology  (Figure 3.2). 
Prudent agents learn to worry about the future, wanting to categor-
ically avoid immoral behavior (as too risky) and instead categori-
cally commit themselves to acting morally even if it appears that 
moral behavior might not maximize personal utility—as prudent 
agents learn to believe that moral behavior is likely to maximize 
long-term utility even when it appears it might not. These motiva-
tions make it rational for prudent individuals to encounter the ‘prob-
lem of possible future selves’—that is, to want to know their future 
interests before the future comes, so that they can avoid possible 
regret. This leads prudent agents to want to justify their actions to 
all their possible future selves, but also, in turn, to all possible hu-
man and nonhuman sentient beings. This leads prudent agents to 
(at least implicitly) adopt a Moral Original Position, whereby they 
ask which principles of action all beings could agree upon from a 
standpoint of perfect fairness. This in turn leads prudent agents to 
recognize and aim to conform to Four Principles of Fairness. These 
Four Principles must then be applied, leading prudent agents to 
investigate what nonarbitrary bargaining power (viz. the Principle 
of Fair Negotiation) involves at a social and political level, both at 
a global level (viz. world affairs) and within particular societies. 
Because a variety of Social-Political Original Positions represent 
precisely this, the prudent individual will (at least implicitly) adopt 
Social- Political Original Positions to arrive at answers to questions 
of justice, and a Nonideal Original Position to determine what is 
right and just at a first-order level in an unjust world. Although im-
perfectly prudent agents (e.g. you, I, and every other human being) 
may only conform to this psychology imperfectly and perhaps at a 
very incomplete or implicit level, elements of this descriptive model 
should show up in the cognition and motivation of people who have 
internalized prudential motives.
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4 Conclusion
Some readers will undoubtedly find the theory of morality just de-
fended, based on Chapter 2’s findings, to be controversial. However, 
as we will now see in Chapter 4, it and the theory of prudence it is 
based upon both cohere with and explain the neurobehavioral phe-
nomena summarized in Chapter 1 better than existing alternatives.
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